

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ERDA-05 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07
EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NASA-01
NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01
OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDE-00 NRC-05
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9369
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 5978

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
SUBJ: CCD: US-SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS, FOURTH
ROUND: SIX (FINAL) SESSION

1. SUMMARY: DURING SIXTH AND FINAL SESSION OF FOURTH
ROUND OF US-SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS THE
US ANSWERED QUESTIONS POSED AT PREVIOUS SESSION ON
SEVERAL TECHNICAL POINTS AND ON TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL
ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION. US PROPOSED AUGUST 16 AS
BEGINNING DATE FOR FIFTH ROUND. SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD
SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. END SUMMARY

2. SIXTH AND FINAL SESSION OF FOURTH ROUND OF
US-SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS WAS HELD MONDAY
MORNING, JULY 18.

3. US EXPERT (MIKULAK) NOTED THAT US DOES NOT QUESTION
THE ANALYTICAL CHEMICAL TECHNIQUES DESCRIBED IN SOVIET
PAPER ON STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION GIVEN AT SECOND ROUND. HOWEVER,
US DOES NOT BELIEVE PAPER DEALS SATISFACTORILY WITH OTHER
TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION,
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FOR EXAMPLE, HOW TO CONFIRM THAT STOCKS ARE DESTROYED
RATHER THAN DIVERTED.

4. MIKULAK ALSO STATED THAT OUR TECHNICAL ANALYSES OF
REMOTE MONITORING TECHNIQUES SUGGESTED BY SOVIET SIDE HAD
NOT CONFIRMED THEIR USEFULNESS IN DETECTING CHEMICAL AGENTS
AT LOW CONCENTRATIONS FROM DISTANCES OF HUNDREDS OR

THOUSANDS OF KILOMETERS. NOR DOES US FIND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE TO BE PERSUASIVE.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT WHAT CRITERIA WOULD BE USED FOR DETERMINING THE QUANTITIES OF SUPER-TOXIC CHEMICALS WHICH COULD LEGITIMATELY BE PRODUCED UNDER THE CONVENTION, MIKULAK SUGGESTED THAT ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO ADOPT GUIDELINES WHICH REFLECT CURRENT LEVEL OF USE FOR SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL AND PROTECTIVE RESEARCH. SUCH WORK DOES NOT REQUIRE THE KILOGRAM QUANTITIES CHARACTERISTIC OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS.

6. US EXPERT (LEONARD) RESPONDED TO A QUESTION CONCERNING A BAN ON THE USE OF LIVE LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS IN FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES. SOVIET EXPERT (CHUGUNOV) HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THIS BAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL AGENTS WHICH WOULD BE PERMITTED. LEONARD EXPLAINED THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OPEN AIR USE OF LIVE LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS IN FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES WITH TROOPS IS NECESSARY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CW PROTECTION EQUIPMENT AND THEREFORE SAW NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, WE DO ENVISAGE USE OF SMALL (LABORATORY) QUANTITIES OF LIVE LETHAL AGENTS IN DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING.

7. ELABORATING ON HIS REPLY TO A SOVIET QUESTION ON CONFIDENTIAL

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VERIFICATION MADE AT PREVIOUS SESSION, US DELEGATION HEAD (FISHER) MADE POINT THAT A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF CONTROL WHICH RELIES ON SELF-POLICING AND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE NEEDED FOR A STABLE AND DURABLE CONVENTION. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION, IF IT SUSPECTED THAT A PLANT IN THE USA WAS PRODUCING PROHIBITED CHEMICAL AGENTS, WOULD BE SATISFIED BY A REPORT BY THE US GOVERNMENT THAT THE SUSPICIONS WERE UNFOUNDED; OR WOULD THE USSR PREFER SOME WAY OF SATISFYING ITSELF AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE US REPLY WAS CORRECT? THE US BELIEVES THAT INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MEANS CAN PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF ASSURANCE WHICH WE CONSIDER NECESSARY WITHOUT INFRINGING ON SOVEREIGNTY OR JEOPARDIZING LEGITIMATE MILITARY, INDUSTRIAL OR COMMERCIAL SECRETS. FISHER NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, TOO, HAD INCLUDED CERTAIN MEASURES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL IN PRESENTING ITS VIEWS ON VERIFICATION AND, WHILE THERE ARE STILL BROAD DIFFERENCES IN OUR APPROACHES, WE HOPE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND.

8. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE (LIKHACHEV) SAID HIS SIDE

HAD NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. HE GAVE BRIEF SUMMATION OF THE CURRENT SESSION IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FULL AND CLEAR ANSWERS WHICH US SIDE HAD GIVEN TO SOVIET QUESTIONS AND SAID IT WAS NOW TIME TO STUDY US PROPOSALS MORE THOROUGHLY IN MOSCOW.

9. US PROPOSED AUGUST 16 AS BEGINNING DATE FOR NEXT ROUND. LIKHACHEV SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS SUGGESTION TO MOSCOW AND SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. VANDEN HEUVEL

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Disposition Approved on Date:
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